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The recent 2007 tax case ITC 1819 (2007) 69 SATC 159 is noteworthy on
two grounds. First, it is one of only a few SouthAfrican tax cases dealing with
the application and interpretation of double taxation agreements (DTAs), in
this instance an agreement concluded between Lesotho and South Africa.
Secondly, it highlights two crucial issues in such cases, namely the
importance of determining the correct tax-paying entity and the interaction
between DTAs and domestic tax legislation.
The facts of the case are quite straightforward. The taxpayer, an attorney
resident in SouthAfrica, was a partner in a law ﬁrm established in Lesotho. In
the relevant tax year the Lesotho authorities levied tax on the taxpayer’s
share of the partnership proﬁts for that year in accordance with the tax
treatment of partnerships in Lesotho. This treatment is much the same as in
South Africa, namely that, although a partnership is required to ﬁle a
partnership return, the income from the partnership is attributed to the
partners according to their respective shares of the partnership income, and
tax is levied on that income in the hands of the partner and not the
partnership.
Since the taxpayer was a resident of South Africa, his share of the
partnership proﬁts was subject to tax in South Africa and included in his
‘gross income’ in terms of the SouthAfrican Income TaxAct 58 of 1962 (the
Act). As the same income was subject to tax in both Lesotho and South
Africa, the taxpayer sought relief in South Africa for this double taxation.
There were two possible bases for such relief, and he had an election as to
which to rely on.
The ﬁrst was s 6quat of the Act. Section 6quat provides relief to South
African residents from international juridical double taxation if, inter alia, the
source of the income on which the tax is levied is not in South Africa.
(Section 6quat has since been amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment
Act 35 of 2007, but the amendment is not relevant for the present
discussion.) The relief provided by s 6quat is in the form of a rebate (a credit)
for the taxes paid to a foreign government, and is granted against the
taxpayer’s South African tax liability. The disadvantage to the taxpayer of
relying on this form of relief is twofold: ﬁrst, the credit is limited to the
amount of tax he would have paid on that income in South Africa; and
secondly, the income is taken into account in the calculation of his South
African tax liability. There is, therefore, no advantage to the taxpayer: he
pays the same amount of tax that he would have paid if the income had been
earned in South Africa. In contrast, if income earned in a foreign country is
exempt from tax in South Africa as a result of the right to tax being allocated
exclusively to that foreign country, this exempt income is not taken into
account at all in the calculation of the taxpayer’s taxable income.
The alternative basis of relief was the application of the DTA entered into
between South Africa and Lesotho (the Lesotho DTA, published in GN 607
GG 17948 of 22April 1997). On the taxpayer’s interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the Lesotho DTA, the income earned in Lesotho was exempt
from tax in SouthAfrica because Lesotho was allocated the exclusive right to
tax. If this were correct, the income would not be taken into account at all in
the calculation of his South Africa taxable income.
The taxpayer exercised his right to elect, conﬁrmed by s 6quat(2), and
relied on the Lesotho DTA rather than on the provisions of s 6quat.
The Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service had a different
interpretation of the Lesotho DTA, however. On its interpretation the
taxpayer was entitled only to a credit for the tax paid in Lesotho, the end
result being the same as that under s 6quat. The taxpayer objected to the
Commissioner’s form of relief, contending that he was entitled, under the
Lesotho DTA, to relief in the form of an exemption. The dispute centred on
the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Lesotho DTA.
The taxpayer’s interpretation of the relief to be afforded to him hinged on
the ﬁrst sentence of art 7 of the Lesotho DTA, which states that ‘[t]he proﬁts
of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State’. This
sentence in effect allocates the exclusive right to tax to the country in which
the enterprise is resident, with the country of source having to exempt that
proﬁt from tax. According to the taxpayer, this sentence was to be
interpreted to mean the right to tax was allocated exclusively to Lesotho,
being the country where the enterprise, in this case the partnership, was
resident.
In rejecting the taxpayer’s argument, Van der Merwe J pointed out that art
7 must be read together with arts 3 and 4 of the Lesotho DTA (see paras 5 and
6 of his judgment). In particular, art 3(f) deﬁnes ‘an enterprise of a
Contracting State’ as ‘an enterprise carried on by a resident of a Contracting
State’, and art 4 deﬁnes the term ‘resident’. To rely on art 7 and be subject to
tax in Lesotho only, the taxpayer would have to be an enterprise resident and
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liable to tax in Lesotho. As the taxpayer was not resident in Lesotho, this
interpretation had to fail.
In rejecting the taxpayer’s argument, Van der Merwe J stated that the
taxpayer’s proposition ‘is dependent on whether C [the partnership] is liable
to tax in Lesotho’ (para 8). Although correct in identifying tax residence as a
prerequisite for relying on art 7, this statement does, with respect, appear to
blur the distinction between the identity of the taxpayer and that of the
partnership. Even if the partnership itself were liable to tax in Lesotho for the
purposes of art 7, it is the partnership’s income that would be exempt from
tax in South Africa.
Since South African law does not recognize a partnership as a person and
does not levy tax on the partnership itself, the partner who is resident in
South Africa will still be taxed in South Africa on his portion of the
partnership income. This is simply because a DTA relieves juridical double
taxation, namely the taxation of the same person and the same income. In the
case of a partnership, although the income may be the same, the same person
is not being taxed. Of importance here is the recognition that the correct
application of a DTAand the relief it offers depends on correctly determining
the resident seeking relief in the application of the DTA. This is particularly
so when dealing with partnership income.
When a DTA applies to partnership income, whether it is the partner or
the partnership that is the resident depends on whether a partnership is
treated as a person or a transparent entity. The different treatment of
partnerships by countries has been discussed extensively by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see the OECD’s
Report on Partnerships (1999); ‘The application of the OECD Model Tax
Convention to partnerships’ in (2000) 6 Issues in International Taxation; and
see the commentary on art 1 in OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and
Capital (2005) paras 2–6.6). The need for this report and commentary arose
because the different treatment of partnerships in different jurisdictions could
result either in different relief, or none at all, being granted to the taxpayer.
This is clearly seen in the current case where the taxpayer would not have
been entitled to relief in terms of the Lesotho DTA if Lesotho had treated a
partnership as a person. As neither South Africa nor Lesotho treats a
partnership as a person for tax purposes, this problem does not arise in respect
of the application of the Lesotho DTA.
There is, however, a view stated in the OECD partnership report (at
13–14) that if a partnership is treated and taxed like a company, the
partnership should be able to qualify as a resident for the purposes of a DTA.
In this regard, s 66(15) of the Act and s 75 of the Lesotho Income Tax Act 9
of 1993, which provides that a partnership must render a joint return, could
potentially be seen as treating a partnership as a legal entity. Van der Merwe J
rejected this view by stating (para 8) that
‘although registered as a tax entity, [the partnership] is not liable to tax in
Lesotho. The position in respect of partnerships in Lesotho would appear to be
similar to the position provided for in respect of partnerships by the [Income
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Tax] Act. The Act provides in s 66(15) that persons carrying on any business in
partnership shall make a joint return of partners in respect of such business but
in terms of s 77(7) that separate assessments shall notwithstanding be made
upon partners.’
That it is the partner and not the partnership upon which tax is levied has
been conﬁrmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Chipkin (Natal) (Pty) Ltd
v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2005 (5) SA 566 (SCA). In this
case Cloete JA stated that the Act recognizes only income — being gross
income less applicable exemptions — that accrues to the partners in
common, and then attributes that income to each partner proportionally
(para 11). In relation to the allowable deductions and allowances, Cloete JA
stated that these are attributed to the partners in proportion, resulting in the
taxable income of each partner, with each partner taxed on his or her
partnership income (para 12).
Notwithstanding the use of the partnership in Lesotho, it is the partner, a
SouthAfrican resident, who is the taxpayer. The double taxation is as a result
of a resident of South Africa deriving income from Lesotho, with both
countries having the right to levy tax, the former on the basis of residence
and the latter on the basis of source.
The second issue highlighted by this case is the interaction between DTAs
and domestic tax legislation. As part of the enquiry to determine whether the
income from the taxpayer was to be categorized as ‘business income’ under
art 7 of the Lesotho DTA or ‘income from independent personal services’
under art 14, Van der Merwe J considered s 24H(2) of the Act (para 11). In
doing this he placed reliance on a deeming provision found in domestic law
to interpret a DTA.
Section 24H(2) provides that where any trade or business is carried on in a
partnership, each member of such partnership shall, notwithstanding that he
may be a limited partner, be deemed for the purposes of the Act to be
carrying on such trade or business. On the assumption that a law ﬁrm is a
trade or business, applying this subsection means that the South African
resident taxpayer is deemed to be carrying on the trade or business of the
Lesotho partnership in South Africa. The use of a deeming provision of
South African domestic law to interpret a provision of a DTA raises a
question, not discussed in the judgment, about the interaction between
domestic legislation and a DTA.
In terms of the Lesotho DTA, if a term is not deﬁned, reference may be
made to the domestic laws of the relevant country to determine its meaning.
Article 3(2) provides that a term shall, ‘unless the context otherwise requires,
have the meaning which it has under the laws of that State concerning the
taxes which are the subject of this Agreement’. Article 3(2) thus allows, in
this limited sense, domestic law to be used. However, art 3(2) does not
appear to include references to deeming provisions. In addition, although
the provisions of a DTAand theAct should be read together (s 108 of theAct
has the effect that a DTAbecomes part of the Act), consideration needs to be
given to the possibility that deeming provisions could potentially undermine
or affect the application of a DTA.
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In the absence of s 24H(2), the partnership in Lesotho is not necessarily a
business or trade carried on by the taxpayer. For instance, the partnership
might be carrying on a business in Lesotho but the partner might not
necessarily be carrying on the business of the partnership. The partner’s
contribution to the partnership could merely be in the form of capital or an
intangible good, or the rendering of services from South Africa. The latter
possibility in relation to a foreign partnership is illustrated by Commissioner for
Inland Revenue v Epstein 19 SATC 221; 1954 (3) SA 689 (A), where
Centlivres CJ stated (at 699D-E in the SALR):
‘It may be said that when there is a partnership the members of which carry on
their business activities in two different countries, the income of the
partnership is derived from two sources and that when one of the partners
carries on his business activities in the Union his income from the partnership is
derived from a source within the Union while the income of the other partner
is derived from a source in a foreign country. For the income which the
partner, who carries on his business activities in the Union receives is the quid
pro quo for the services he renders in the Union to the partnership.’
By contrast, the use of the deeming provision has the result that the
income is categorized as business income in South Africa. It may be that
without the deeming provision, the income would have been categorized as
being income from independent personal services. The other contracting
state, in this case Lesotho, may, on the application of its domestic laws,
classify the income as falling under the latter. This mismatch between the
articles of the DTA could potentially result in the taxpayer’s not being
granted any relief.
This case illustrates precisely this possibility. The income is classiﬁed in
South Africa as business income, and accordingly the allocation of the taxing
rights between SouthAfrica and Lesotho is to be determined by art 7. On the
application of this article, SouthAfrica as the resident country of the taxpayer
is allocated the exclusive right to tax the income. South Africa will only
recognize Lesotho’s right to tax income that is attributable to a permanent
establishment of the taxpayer in Lesotho and in this event, provide relief in
the form of a credit by applying art 22.
If Lesotho classiﬁes the income as arising from independent personal
services, it may, in terms of art 14, tax the income to the extent that services
are rendered in Lesotho, and if the taxpayer has a ﬁxed base regularly
available to him in Lesotho for the purpose of performing his activities, the
income attributable to that ﬁxed base.
In the event that the taxpayer does not have a permanent establishment in
Lesotho, SouthAfrica will tax the income on the basis of the residence of the
taxpayer in accordance with art 7. As South Africa will be applying its
domestic law as allowed by art 3(2) and by the incorporation of the treaty
into the Act in terms of s 108(2), South Africa has no obligation to recognize
the basis on which Lesotho is levying the source taxation. From the South
African perspective, it will have an exclusive right to tax the income. As
pointed out by Skaar, ‘mainstream opinion seems to be that both countries
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are entitled to use their own deﬁnition of terms that are not deﬁned in the
treaty itself’ under art 3(2) (Juris Skaar ‘The concept of permanent
establishment: Commentary on article 5 of the OECD Model Treaty’ IBFD
Database, available at http://ip-online2.ibfd.org/pe/ at para 2.6.2 of ch 2, last
accessed on 10 May 2008). The disadvantage pointed out by him, that
‘income may . . . be classiﬁed as business proﬁts [in one country] and subject
to residence taxation, and the same income may be classiﬁed as income from
personal services subject to source taxation [in the other country]’, could
potentially result owing to the use of the s 24H(2) deeming provision. The
potential mismatch of categories would always exist as a result of the
application of each country’s domestic law.
A possible solution, as indicated by Skaar loc cit, is for both states party to
the treaty to use the concept of business proﬁts as determined by the source
state’s domestic law. On the basis of this approach, Van der Merwe J should
not have embarked on an analysis to determine the category of the income
but should merely have referred to the category used by Lesotho. Whether
or not Skaar’s approach is seen as undermining the sovereignty of a country
in enacting its own domestic tax legislation, it offers a solution to a problem
created by the use of domestic legislation in the application and interpreta-
tion of DTAs, particularly in the use of deeming provisions.
More pertinent, however, in my opinion, is that the s 24H(2) deeming
provision is used out of its intended context. Section 24H deals with the
treatment of partnership income. In particular, it provides a method for
ensuring that partnership income is not kept in the partnership, as was
decided in Sacks v Commissioner for Inland Revenue1946AD 31. In the context
of the present case, it is not the partnership income that is being taxed in
South Africa but the proﬁt that the partner receives as a result of his business
activities in Lesotho. In the judgment of Van der Merwe J there is no
reference to the calculation of this proﬁt in accordance with s 24H. The only
reference to the calculation of the taxpayer’s proﬁt states that the taxpayer
was entitled to a share of the proﬁts of the partnership, being ‘[a]n equal share
in the total proﬁt (ie total income not consisting only of fees less total
expenses)’ of the partnership.
The purpose of s 24H(2) in particular is to allow a partner to be able to
deduct the proportionate share of the expenses and losses of the partnership
by deeming the partner to carry on the trade or business of the partnership.
Without s 24H(2), a partner would not necessarily be able to deduct the
expenses successfully as the partner would not necessarily be carrying on a
trade or business.
In addition, the calculation of partnership income in Lesotho might be
different to that under s 24H. In terms of s 24H, as stated in Chipkin (supra)
by Cloete JA (paras 11–12), income (being gross income less exemptions)
accrues to the partners in common and is then attributed to them
proportionately. Similarly, in terms of s 24H(2) deductions and allowances
are attributed to the partners proportionately. An alternative method of
calculating the proﬁt of a partner was rejected in Chipkin (para 12) in
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applying s 24H. This alternative method calculated the partnership income
as if the partnership were a separate legal person. In this calculation the
income of a partnership would be determined separately, with the Act
attributing to each individual partner a proportionate share of the partner-
ship’s taxable income. That this different method can lead to a different
amount being taxed in the hands of the partner is clearly illustrated by
Chipkin. The portion of the income of the taxpayer as partner may therefore
be different depending on which method of calculation is used.
Thus the interpretation of terms in a DTA in accordance with domestic
law has consequences not only for the categorization of the income under
the DTA but also for the amount that would form part of gross income if
s 24H were to be applied.
Although it is likely that the same result would have been reached in the
present case irrespective of whether the issues dealt with in this note had
been raised, the case nevertheless serves to illustrate the importance of the
correct application of DTAs: ﬁrst, in ensuring that the resident of the
contracting state seeking relief has been correctly identiﬁed, and secondly,
that the income is dealt with under the correct category. More pertinently,
however, it highlights the potential problems that arise in the interaction
between a DTA and deeming provisions in the Act.
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